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The severe international financial crises which rocked the
Latin American economies in the 1980s and 1990s suggest
that the international financial system suffers from serious
defects. This article looks at one of the reforms which has
been mooted in recent years: strengthening regional finan-
cial cooperation. It concludes that a Latin American fund
made up of a modest portion of the reserves of the countries
of the region, possibly backed up with contingency credits
from the international banking system, could be an effec-
tive line of defense against financial crises caused by capi-
tal flight and could help to prevent the spread of crises within
the region. A fund of this nature could also have other func-
tions, such as providing finance to cope with balance of
payments problems associated with temporary slumps in the
terms of trade. It would also promote harmonization of the
macroeconomic policies of its members, which is an essen-
tial condition for achieving more stable bilateral exchange
rates and effective regional integration. Such a regional fund
would not be a substitute for the International Monetary
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I
Introduction
iii) protecting intra-regional trade and investments at
times of global financial crisis;
iv) providing a forum to help in the coordination of
macroeconomic policies, thus leading to less vul-
nerability to external crises and greater stability of
bilateral exchange rates; and
v) promoting the exchange of information on mat-
ters vital for international financial stability, such
as prudential regulation of the financial sector and
capital flows.
After it is posited in the introduction to this article that
the nature of financial crises within the context of
globalized finance makes it advisable to have stronger
regional institutions in this field, section II deals with
the last-generation financial crises and their effects on
recipient economies. Section III sets out the arguments
in favour of the strengthening of regional financial
mechanisms. Section IV deals with the role such
mechanisms could play in promoting regional
integration. Section V then describes two of the
international financial cooperation institutions which
already exist in the region: the Latin American Reserve
Fund (FLAR) and the Mutual Payments and Credits
Agreement (CPCR) of the Latin American Integration
Association (ALADI), after which section VI presents
some options for strengthening the regional financial
institutions to face the challenges of financial
globalization and Latin American integration. Section
VII analyses the feasibility of a strengthened regional
fund and the size it should have in order to be considered
capable of coping with the challenges of globalization.
Finally, section VIII presents some conclusions.
The recurrent international financial crises which have
rocked the “emerging” economies have given rise to a
vigorous debate on possible reforms in the international
financial architecture. Many reform proposals have
been put forward, and some of them include the
creation of regional monetary bodies (see Ocampo,
1999, pp. 68-70; Mistry, 1999; FLAR, 2000). This article
analyses the importance of the role that could be played
by measures to strengthen the capability of regional
bodies to tackle financial “contagion” and promote
intra-regional trade and investment.
The Latin American countries have been particu-
larly active in efforts to establish subregional financial
institutions to come to the aid of countries with bal-
ance of payments problems. There are also regional
and subregional mutual payments mechanisms in Latin
America which are designed to reduce the need to re-
sort to foreign exchange to finance payments among
their members. Although these institutions have played
an important role in the last two or three decades, they
need to be strengthened in order to face up to the chal-
lenges of globalization and become the regional link
currently absent from the international financial archi-
tecture.
Strengthening the regional financial institutions
would have the following objectives:
i) helping member countries to cope with balance of
payments crises due to reasons unconnected with
the quality of their macroeconomic policies;
ii) promoting regional integration by furthering
greater stability of the bilateral exchange rates be-
tween the countries of the region;
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II
The latest generation of financial crises
The international financial crisis set off by the depre-
ciation of the Thai baht in July 1997 had world
repercussions and severely affected the developing
countries which had managed to gain access to the
international capital markets. In this context, the Latin
American countries were not able to isolate their
economies from the vicissitudes of international capi-
tal. As from 1998, the region’s growth rate markedly
deteriorated, and in 1999 they turned in their worst
economic performance since the debt crisis.
In the paragraphs below we will define more
precisely what the word “contagion” means in this
context. Suffice it to say at this point that we consider
contagion to mean a pure external shock which has
nothing to do with the virtues or shortcomings of the
domestic economic policy of the countries affected by
it. Generally speaking, the term contagion has been used
with reference to the financial field: a financial crisis
acts as a signal, and this signal sets off forms of herd
behaviour in the capital markets. Although this is one
of the most important forms of contagion in a finan-
cially globalized world economy, it is by no means the
only form, however. There are countries in Latin
America which participate only marginally in the
global financial markets but have nevertheless been se-
verely affected by the indirect effects that events in those
markets have on their terms of trade or export volumes.
For these reasons, we use the term contagion in a
broader sense which also naturally covers capital flight
caused by international financial problems in other
countries or by interest rate rises in the industrialized
countries.
The contagion mechanisms suffered by the region
during the most recent world financial crisis were of
various types:
i) there was trade contagion through the impact on
the terms of trade caused by the recession in the
Asian economies (which were the hardest hit by
the financial crisis): the prices of various raw ma-
terials exported by the Latin American countries
to international markets went down sharply.
Although it is true that the fall in the prices of
export products was offset to some extent in some
cases by lower prices of some imported products
(especially oil and manufactures), there was nev-
ertheless a deterioration in the terms of trade of
most of the countries;1
ii) trade contagion also occurred through a contrac-
tion in the volumes of exports to Asia, with
particularly severe effects on the countries for
which the Asian economies are important markets,
but it also took the form of a disproportionate
contraction in intra-regional exports, which are
concentrated on manufactures;
iii) financial contagion was serious for most of the
countries of the region, and it had particularly ad-
verse effects. As a result of the run on capital by
all the emerging countries, the banks and compa-
nies of many countries of the region had difficulty
in renewing their lines of credit. The spreads at
which they could sell new corporate bonds
increased dramatically. In some cases, even first-line
companies in the region simply could not sell bonds
at any price, while foreign portfolio investors
liquidated their holdings;
iv) financial contagion also had a purely domestic
aspect. The sudden increase in exchange risk
caused domestic agents to shift their investments
from national-currency securities to others denomi-
nated in dollars, thus aggravating the trend towards
depreciation of the local currency. Companies with
foreign-exchange liabilities, accumulated during
the long period of easy availability of foreign capi-
tal, hastened to cover themselves, thus further ag-
gravating the crisis caused by the flight of foreign
capital and the non-renewal of loans by the inter-
national banking system;
v) all the countries (except those with fixed exchange
rates) registered excessive degrees of exchange-
rate depreciation in nominal and even in some cases
real terms, although some of these have now been
reversed.
Most of the countries of the region suffered both trade
and financial contagion, which was why the crisis had
such severe effects. The consequences of both types of
1 This study was completed before the oil price rises in the second
half of 2000.
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contagion can be relieved through the provision of
suitable finance. In the case of trade contagion, if it is
expected that the deterioration in the terms of trade and/
or the drop in export volumes are temporary and re-
versible, the best policy is to obtain compensatory fi-
nance to tide over the period of such problems. This is
the reason for the existence of the IMF Compensatory
Financing Facility.
Financial contagion is also of a temporary nature.
As the Mexican and Asian crises of the 1990s showed,
inflows and outflows of capital follow each other in a
cyclical manner (a matter which will be dealt with
below in greater detail). If balance of payments problems
are due to financial contagion, there would be grounds
for the provision of advance lines of credit to supple-
ment the international reserves of the countries affected,
thus saving their authorities from having to apply over-
restrictive policies to reduce the external deficit.
In view of the globalization of finance, the growing
participation of the countries of the region in the inter-
national capital markets and the behaviour of both do-
mestic and international financial agents make it very
likely that financial crises will be increasingly frequent
and increasingly due to contagion from outside. The
reforms proposed in the international financial archi-
tecture are designed to reduce the likelihood that such
crises will occur and protect the developing countries
from the worst effects of those that do take place.2
This means that the balance of payments crises now
being suffered by many countries may have little to do
with erroneous macroeconomic policies. The typical
balance of payments crises to which we were accus-
tomed in the region in the past were due to current
account deficits which it became impossible to finance.
The macroeconomic policies associated with these
crises included heavy fiscal deficits (even in cyclic
boom periods), which had to be monetarized in some
way, and over-expansionary monetary policies or in-
sistence on the maintenance of an overvalued exchange
rate (perhaps because domestic inflation had been
higher than international levels for a substantial length
of time). Imprudent macroeconomic policies led to ul-
timately unsustainable current account deficits and to
loss of reserves by the Central Bank. It is this kind of
situations that the IMF is prepared to tackle by granting
its conditional loans.
The region is not of course entirely free as yet of
these “first generation crises” (whose formal expres-
sion as a model may be found in Krugman, 1979). What
distinguishes the present crises from those crises is that
they now occur in several countries in sequence, often
without any evident causes attributable to the macro-
economic management of the countries concerned. This
is what we call “financial contagion”. As we shall see
below, this sequential nature was very evident in the
Asian financial crisis.
An empirically verifiable constant is that countries
which become victims of this new generation of crises
associated with globalization first of all receive a heavy
inflow of capital. This is what happened in Mexico in
the period before 1994, and it also happened in all the
countries most severely rocked by the recent financial
crisis: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines,
South Korea, Russia, Brazil and Argentina. Thus, to some
extent financial crises are gestated during periods of
excessive capital inflows, especially of short-term
capital (Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). The massive inflow
of resources into certain countries is due to a combina-
tion of factors, including the favourable perceptions of
foreign financial investors or simply expectations that
the currency in question will appreciate.3  Since interest
rates are normally higher in emerging markets than in
those of the developed countries, expectations of
exchange-rate appreciation can spark off heavy capital
inflows.
Those inflows are often by no means marginal for
an individual recipient. In emerging economies, they
may amount to over 10% of the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). Furthermore, as the financial markets of those
economies are very shallow, capital movements often
form a very high proportion of the national finances.
As may be seen from table 1, whereas in the developed
countries international capital movements hardly ever
exceed 5% of the (M2) money supply, in emerging
economies they may amount to as much as 25%.
Consequently, waves of capital inflows can cause
serious negative externalities in the developing countries,
for they can generate current account deficits, lead to
exchange rate appreciation, give rise to asset price
bubbles, and increase the national financial system’s
3
 This is a rather sui generis international version of Keynes’s
“beauty queen contests” (Eatwell, 1997, p. 243). Thus, some agents
are more sensitive to what other agents plan to do than to the in-
trinsic value of assets. When these agents predominate over the
“fundamentalists”, financial markets can become extremely vola-
tile.
2
 There is extensive literature on this subject, and many reform
proposals have been put forward. See for example Ocampo (1999),
Eichengreen (1999), Agosin (1999) and Ahluwalia (2000).
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vulnerability to a run on short-term credits or failure to
renew them. Moreover, they often raise the ratio of
short-term debt to the international reserves. Likewise,
the short-term nature of capital flows means that
investors can easily leave the country in masses and
creditors may refuse to renew their loans as soon as
they sense some problem.
When there is a change in the fundamental
economic variables, at some point the perceptions of
vulnerability begin to grow and the inflow of capital
shrinks and may even turn into a net outflow, with
massive flight of resources. When a country has lost a
certain volume of its reserves, foreign and domestic
financial investors perceive the existence of exchange
risk, and when fears of devaluation begin to gather
force, everyone begins to liquidate their national
currency holdings or try to cover their foreign-exchange
liabilities, thus speeding up the loss of reserves and
precipitating an acute crisis.
As the banks were major recipients of foreign
credits during the boom period, outflows of capital are
associated with the non-renewal of credits and cause
serious banking crises. Because of this, the last-
generation crises are usually “twin crises” affecting the
balance of payments and the banking system
simultaneously (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996;
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998).
It should be stressed that in the present context both
inflows and outflows of capital are subject to contagion.
In the case of inflows, portfolio investors and bank
creditors tend to underestimate the risks involved in
investing or lending money to agents in the recipient
economy. Inflows of capital into an emerging economy
are usually accompanied by inflows into other countries
with similar characteristics. In contrast, at times of
abrupt outflows there is a tendency to overestimate the
risks involved in staying in them (Ocampo, 1999, p.
21). The vast majority of the Latin American economies
received enormous amounts of portfolio investments
and international bank loans in the 1990s. Among these
economies, some had already carried out profound
economic reforms, while others were just embarking
on that process (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993;
Devlin, Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones, 1995;
Ocampo and Steiner, 1994). Consequently, although
many countries had made great progress in their
macroeconomic management, many were very
vulnerable to contagion from financial stampedes like
those that occurred after the Asian crisis, the Russian
crisis (July 1998) and the two Brazilian crises (August-
September 1998 and January 1999).
When there are capital inflows which are very
large in comparison with the size of the financial
markets of the recipient economies, macroeconomic
management becomes a very complicated business in
the latter. Although it is possible to counteract the
expansionary effect of the inflows to some extent with
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, no Latin
American country has been completely successful in
this, even in the case of those like Chile and Colombia
which made this an explicit objective of their economic
policy. Experience shows that the wisest course for
emerging economies is to adopt prudential regulations
on capital flows.
Although there is evidence that some forms of
financial contagion are simultaneous (simultaneous
increases in the spreads that debtors in emerging
economies must pay, for example), the experience of
the last few years indicates that international financial
crises tend to occur sequentially. After one economy
begins to suffer from capital outflows, international
investors and creditors begin to have doubts about the
creditworthiness of debtors in other countries which
might display similar symptoms. In some cases, the
contagion is due to the effects of the initial crisis: the
exchange-rate depreciation caused by the first crisis
makes the exports of other economies with similar
export profiles less competitive.
TABLE 1
Developed and emergent economies (14 countries):
Net capital flowsa as a percentage of M2b
Country 1990-1998 1990-1994 1995-1998
Japan 1.7 1.8 1.7
Canada 3.1 4.2 1.7
United States 3.1 2.1 4.2
Switzerland 5.7 5.3 6.0
South Korea 5.7 4.7 7.0
Brazil 7.2 3.3 10.4
Indonesia 9.1 8.9 8.4
Malaysia 11.2 13.2 6.3
Venezuela 14.5 18.5 11.4
Chile 18.6 18.9 19.2
Colombia 18.5 11.8 26.0
Mexico 18.9 23.8 12.9
Ecuador 19.6 16.4 19.3
Argentina 22.0 25.5 18.2
Source: IMF (2000).
a Net inflows or outflows (outflows in the case of Switzerland
and Japan, inflows in all the other countries).
b Currency outside banks, demand deposits, term deposits and
savings deposits.
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III
The role of regional funds in
coping with financial crises
As already noted at the beginning of this article, the
phenomena described here have given rise to the
perception that the international financial architecture
needs major modifications and have set off a very
interesting international debate on the elements that
should make up this new structure. One conclusion
reached is that much greater importance should be
attached to the regional monetary institutions as an extra
line of defense against financial crises and contagion.
This objective of strengthening the regional
financial institutions does not mean making them take
the place of the IMF, which is a key institution in the
international monetary system. No regional fund would
have either the volume of resources of the IMF or the
political capacity to mobilize large-scale financial
rescue operations when necessary. Moreover, many
international financial problems go beyond the regional
ambit and require global solutions.
Regional funds could however be an important link
between individual countries and a strengthened and
reformed IMF, thus giving the system greater capacity
to promote international financial stability.
Furthermore, if international-level reforms were not
carried out, this would be all the more reason for the
Latin American countries to strengthen their lines of
defense against financial crises by strengthening
regional cooperation.
There are a variety of reasons for strengthening
regional funds. All the Latin American countries are
continually exposed to temporary external shocks due
to fluctuations in their terms of trade, higher interest
rates on international financial markets, or financial
shocks like those described earlier. These shocks can
be tackled in various different ways. One way is self-
insurance, which consists of maintaining higher levels
of international reserves than those currently prevailing
or arranging contingency credit lines with the
international banking system. This solution involves
two problems: the opportunity cost of the reserves is
high, and the contingency credits that each country
could expect to receive from the international banking
system are costly and quite modest in size. A second
option would be to resort directly to the IMF. The Latin
American countries will undoubtedly continue to do
this when they run into severe financial difficulties, but
the Fund usually imposes conditions which are not
always the right ones for dealing with the problem, and
its decisions are usually too slow to cope with problems
that call for quick responses. Finally, the Latin American
countries have very little influence on the IMF’s decisions
and criteria.
For all these reasons, making use of a regional body
could be an attractive option. A regional monetary body
could respond effectively to essentially regional
problems. The desirability of having adequate reserves
to deal with common problems is thus a powerful
argument in favour of establishing what would in effect
be an international credit union in the region. If at the
same time financial crises have an element of regional
contagion, the arguments in favour of forming regional
funds to deal with them become all the stronger,
especially if avoiding a balance of payments crisis in
one country of the region would mean avoiding similar
crises in other countries of the same region. In other
words, a regional financial body would have substantial
externalities.
Regional contagion was clearly visible in the
most recent financial crisis, which had two phases,
both of them with strong regional implications. The
first phase was markedly Asian: it began in July 1997
in Thailand and in the second half of the year it
gradually spread in turn to almost all the emergent
markets of Asia: Indonesia, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and finally,
in November of that year, South Korea. The crisis
was no respecter of persons, affecting not only
countries with high levels of short-term indebtedness
in proportion to their reserves (Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia and South Korea) but also countries with a
very sound reserve situation, such as Hong Kong and
Singapore, and not only countries with high current
account deficits as a proportion of their GDP (Thailand
and Malaysia) but also countries with only moderate
deficits (South Korea and Indonesia) and even
economies with significant surpluses (Singapore and
Hong Kong).
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In 1998, after the Russian crisis, the Brazilian real
had to withstand a first speculative onslaught in August
and September. This worsened the crisis in Latin
America, which was already experiencing substantial
but still manageable trade and financial difficulties. By
the middle of 1998, with the mass exit of portfolio
investors from the emergent economies and the negative
revision of Latin American debtors by international
creditors, the countries of the region had already begun
to experience serious balance of payments problems
which called for severe adjustment policies. It was the
second –and this time successful– attack against the
real in January 1999, however, which sparked off the
most acute phase of the crisis in the other countries of
the region.
If the financial crises were not of a sequential
nature, a regional fund would be unlikely to have
sufficient resources to deal with cases of capital flight
from several countries simultaneously. As crises of this
nature can indeed occur (the debt crisis in the 1980s
was an outstanding example of this), regional funds
cannot play the role of an institution like the IMF in
solving such crises.
If crises gradually spread from one economy to
another, a regional fund capable of stemming the capital
flight from the first country in the region affected would
significant reduce the danger for the other countries of
the region, assuming of course that the initial crisis was
not due to bad macroeconomic management. A regional
body designed to control cases of contagion would not
be suitable for dealing with the latter situation, which
could only be dealt with by the international provision
of liquidity on suitable conditions.
Regional funds are also justified on other grounds.
The countries of a region will have a much greater say
in the policy of a regional fund than in that of an
organization like the IMF, and a regional fund would
therefore meet the needs of its member countries much
more completely. This can be very important when trying
to coordinate monetary and economic policies in order
to attain a more advanced stage in regional integration:
a matter which will be addressed in the next section.
IV
The role of regional funds
in furthering integration
The need to strengthen regional financial cooperation
goes beyond the pursuit of a common line of defense
against possible contagion. Regional integration is a
major objective of the development policy of all the
Latin American countries. In recent years there have
been substantial advances in the trade-related aspects
of integration, both within the framework of the
multilateral integration agreements already operating
in Latin America –MERCOSUR, the Andean Community,
the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)– and between
individual countries. Likewise, since the beginning of
the 1990s a number of quite comprehensive bilateral
trade agreements have been signed. Both the
multilateral and the bilateral agreements have helped
to increase intra-regional trade significantly, and indeed
it has grown faster than inter-regional trade.
However, the lack of harmonization of
macroeconomic policies and the sharp fluctuations
which have taken place in bilateral exchange rates have
militated against faster progress towards trade
integration and mutual investments among the
countries of the region. In the Andean Community, the
strong growth of mutual trade registered in recent years
came to an abrupt stop in 1998 because of the financial
crisis.
So far, governments have acted on the implicit
assumption that progress towards trade integration can
be achieved by concentrating on tariff reduction and
the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade, while leaving
exchange and financial matters for a later stage. Perhaps
now is the time to reverse these priorities. Experience
has shown time and again that exchange rate volatility
and financial crises seriously upset trade flows and end
up in practice by dismantling the formal arrangements
of the trade agreements. An international financial crisis
can suddenly cause the exchange rate of a country vis-
a-vis its regional partners to vary by a much larger
percentage than its most-favoured-nation tariff. This
shows that exchange-rate stability can be more
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important than tariff reductions for promoting regional
and subregional trade flows.
MERCOSUR itself –the most ambitious subregional
integration process of recent time– has come under
considerable pressures precisely because of the
instability of the exchange rate prevailing between its
two biggest members, caused by the impact on the
economies in question of changes in direction of capital
flows and the lack of macroeconomic and exchange
rate coordination between countries.
There are various reasons why financial crises are
so harmful to mutual trade. When a country begins to
suffer from balance of payments problems, two
phenomena occur in particular: its exchange rate is
depreciated vis-a-vis the currencies of its neighbours,
and there is a fall in aggregate demand. This latter effect
can be further amplified by the adoption of restrictive
policies aimed at tackling the balance of payments
crisis. The trade-related effects of these phenomena hit
neighbouring countries particularly hard, since they find
it harder to sell their own products on the market of the
country suffering the crisis, while at the same time they
have to face stronger competition from the exports of
that country.
Latin America’s regional trade is strongly
concentrated on manufactures, the demand for which
is highly sensitive to fluctuations in the exchange rates
and aggregate demand of other members. This is not
so in the case of commodities, which are mainly
exported to the industrialized countries.
Instability in the financial flows to Latin American
countries gives rise to great volatility of bilateral
exchange rates within the region and depresses
economic activity in all the countries of the region.
These two factors are highly prejudicial to the
achievement of closer economic integration.
Generalized financial crises are particularly
harmful to integration. When a country begins to suffer
from contagion from other crises in the region, its
currency is devalued and its producers recover the
competitiveness they lost during the capital inflow
boom that preceded the crisis. The positive effects of
this currency devaluation are obtained at the expense
of its regional partners, however. Furthermore, it cannot
take full advantage of the situation because its regional
partners are suffering recessions on account of the crisis.
The abrupt changes in the competitiveness of Brazilian
producers compared with those of Argentina during the
recent financial crisis are a copybook example of this.
There can be no doubt, then, that in order to achieve
greater integration of trade and investments, greater
exchange stability is needed among the countries
seeking to integrate. Without this, it is unlikely that
much more progress can be made in the region towards
greater integration. This does not mean that we should
hasten to adopt a common currency. Integration
processes take place gradually, and in Latin America
they are still at an early stage. It is essential, however,
to take the first steps towards financial integration, for
which bilateral exchange rates must be much more
stable than they have been so far.
We need only recall the experience of Europe. The
whole of the first stage of European integration took
place within the framework of the exchange rate
stability provided by the system of fixed (but adjustable)
exchange rates adopted at Bretton Woods. When that
system broke down in 1971-1973, much of the work
for establishing a customs union had already been done.
Nevertheless, the members of the European Economic
Community quickly succeeded in giving their bilateral
exchange rates a degree of stability that would have
been impossible if they had decided to use the system
that began to prevail as from 1973 for convertible
currencies: flexible exchange rates with a dirty float.
The European countries, however, decided first that
their currencies would float together within what they
called the “snake”, which limited the fluctuations in
bilateral exchange rates. They the went on to adopt the
European Monetary System (EMS), with an exchange
rate mechanism which fixed a central exchange rate
for each currency with respect to the European Currency
Unit (ECU), with narrow ranges of permissible floats
around that central parity. The final stage in this process
was reached early in 1999, with the establishment of
the Euro.
The stormy moments that the exchange rate
mechanism had to weather during the financial crises
of 1992-1993 did not prevent final progress towards
the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates and the
adoption of the Euro by 11 European countries. There
can be no doubt that the exchange rate stability which
exists among the European countries, to which they
are politically committed, has been a powerful impulse
in favour of trade integration and real investment flows
in Europe.
The existence of Community monetary institutions
and concerted intervention in exchange markets have
helped the European countries to attain the high degree
of exchange rate stability they have enjoyed since the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system.
One of the crucial differences between the mem-
ber countries of the European Union and the Latin
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American nations is that the European countries have
convertible currencies and can carry out interventions
in the exchange markets in their own currency. Fur-
thermore, their central banks (and now likewise the
European Central Bank) have lines of credit from the
United States Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan
for intervening in exchange markets.
The Latin American countries are at a serious
disadvantage in this respect, because as the currency
for intervention is the U.S. dollar, they must use their
reserves for this; furthermore, the possibility of
coordinated intervention by their central banks to
prevent sharp fluctuations and misalignments in
bilateral exchange rates is much weaker, and they do
not enjoy lines of credit from the Federal Reserve. Only
at times of crisis, and even then only in the case of the
biggest countries, can they have a chance of obtaining
emergency financial resources from that source.
Moreover, this only occurs when a crisis has already
broken out, and only under an adjustment programme
agreed with the IMF.
All this suggests that monetary and exchange sup-
port for integration will only be available from a much
fuller system of regional financial institutions than that
which currently exists. In order for Latin America to
achieve greater trade integration, it is important to attain
greater exchange rate stability among the countries of the
region, which would also promote the growth of mutual
investments. This process, which has already begun, is
essential for achieving fuller economic integration.
The objectives of ensuring financial resources for
limiting contagion phenomena at the regional and sub-
regional levels and securing greater bilateral exchange
rate stability are of course interrelated. Financial crises
have an almost immediate effect on exchange rates, so
if a regional financial institution fulfils the objective of
preventing financial crises among its member countries
it will likewise contribute to greater exchange stability
among them.
Exchange rates are also sensitive to economic
policy mismatches. Consequently, by promoting greater
macroeconomic policy convergence, the existence of a
regional financial institution would check exchange rate
volatility among its member countries.
As already noted, financial crises are gestated
during booms in foreign capital inflows. In order to
avoid such crises, it is essential that countries should
take measures to moderate capital inflows when these
threaten to become excessive and to cause a
deterioration in their macroeconomic balances. One of
the missions of a regional financial institution would
be to facilitate the exchange of information and thus
promote common standards for bank regulation and
prudential regulation of capital flows.4  As destabilizing
capital inflows also include flows which do not pass
through the banks (such as direct loans to local
companies and inflows of portfolio investments),
these prudential regulations are not only limited to
adequate bank supervision, although of course this
is essential.
V
A brief review of some existing regional
external payments support institutions
Latin America already has financial and monetary in-
stitutions which carry out to some extent some of the
functions that we consider a regional fund should have.
They are the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), the
Mutual Payments and Credit Agreement (CPCR) of the
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the
Central American Clearing House of the Central Ameri-
can Common Market (CACM), the Latin American Mon-
etary Stabilization Fund of the CACM, and the Carib-
bean Multilateral Clearing Facility of CARICOM.5  An
analysis of their activities and the amounts of finance
these bodies provide would therefore be a good start-
ing point for our study. We will concentrate our atten-
tion in particular on two of these institutions: FLAR and
CPCR.
4
 The recent experience of Chile and Colombia in this field has
been analysed in Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (1997), Le Fort and
Lehmann (2000), Barrera and Cárdenas (1997) and Ocampo and
Tovar (1999).
5
 For a description of other financial cooperation mechanisms in
the region, see ECLAC (1990).
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1. The Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR)
FLAR was originally set up in 1978 by the Andean Com-
munity as the Andean Reserve Fund. In 1991 its then
members (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Ven-
ezuela) decided to throw it open to participation by other
Latin American countries, so that it became in effect a
regional financial institution. At the end of June 1998,
FLAR had assets of some US$ 1,032 million, made up
of the quotas of its member countries and its capital-
ized net profits (FLAR, 1998). With the incorporation of
Costa Rica in mid-2000, FLAR began a process of ex-
pansion to bring in Latin American countries which
are not members of the Andean Community, in order
to increase the Fund’s scope (FLAR, 2000).
The stated objectives of FLAR are:
– To provide member countries with support when
they suffer from balance of payments problems.
– To help in the harmonization of macroeconomic
and exchange policies in order to give countries
support in complying with the commitments en-
tered into under the Cartagena Agreement, which
set up the Andean Community, and the Treaty of
Montevideo, which set up ALADI.
– To improve the conditions for investment of mem-
ber countries’ international reserves.
FLAR is financed primarily from the quotas paid by the
central banks of its member countries. Another way of
securing funds is to accept time deposits by central
banks and other authorized bodies. During the 1997/
1998 financial year (1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998)
central banks and the Andean Parliament made deposits
amounting to US$ 1,837 million, with the balance at
30 June 1998 standing at US$ 237 million (FLAR, 1998).
FLAR’s main activity is the provision of support
services for its members’ balances of payments. Thus,
FLAR is a form of credit union along the lines of the IMF.
The central banks of member countries can draw loans
up to 2½ times their paid-up contribution of capital, in
the case of Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, and up to 3
times that amount in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador.
FLAR provides the following services for the central
banks of its member countries:
– Balance of payments support credits: these are
granted for up to four years, including one year’s
grace, subject to macroeconomic performance
commitments.
– Credits for restructuring the external public debt:
these are granted under co-financing with other
multilateral bodies, with a term of up to four years,
including one year’s grace.
– Liquidity credits: these are designed to help coun-
tries to cover transitory liquidity needs through
credits with a term of up to one year.
– Contingency Financing Facility: this facility, set
up in 1998, is designed to help member countries
to finance temporary balance of payments imbal-
ances of external origin not due to fundamental
inconsistencies in the balance of payments equi-
librium conditions. This finance is for a term of
six months, non-renewable. Loans granted by this
facility must be guaranteed by the debtors with
securities acceptable to FLAR.
– “Andean Peso”: this was created in order to facili-
tate payments between central banks and other au-
thorized holders. It has not been used much so far.
Thus, FLAR covers almost the whole range of activities
that a strengthened regional fund should have. But how
important, in quantitative terms, is the finance provided
to the central banks of member countries in order to
prevent or relieve balance of payments crises, particu-
larly those due to exogenous causes, and how much
does it contribute to the stability of bilateral exchange
rates?
FLAR’s importance as a supplier of finance depends
on its quotas, which are its only stable source of fi-
nance. As may be seen from table 2, the quotas FLAR
receives from its member countries (except in the case
of Venezuela) are significant with respect to their IMF
quotas. Furthermore, access to FLAR resources multi-
plies the value of those quotas by a factor of up to 3.5
for the less developed members (Bolivia and Ecuador)
and 2.5 in the case of the other three members. This
means that Bolivia and Ecuador have access to FLAR
loans worth US$ 437.5 million, which is considerably
more than they could obtain from the IMF, which rarely
grants loans larger than the borrower’s quota, and when
it does, grants them in tranches which are disbursed
only slowly, and against proof that the borrower is com-
plying with the conditions laid down in the Letter of
Intent. The FLAR loans are not devoid of conditions, but
these tend to be less strict. Disbursements are usually
quite rapid, with only a meeting of the Board of Direc-
tors being needed to examine requests for loans greater
than the respective quota, which, if approved, are dis-
bursed forthwith.
For the smaller member countries, FLAR credits rep-
resent a substantial addition to their reserves and to their
capacity to cope with an international financial crisis.
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This is not so in the case of the three largest members,
since their international reserves are a high multiple of
their quotas in FLAR.
The ratio between a country’s short-term debt and
its international reserves may be considered as a reli-
able indicator of that country’s vulnerability to a run
on its currency. Table 2 gives two different calculations
of this ratio: between the short-term debt and the re-
serves as at the end of 1997, and between that debt and
the reserves plus the maximum credit available from
FLAR. As may be seen from the table, access to FLAR’s
resources significantly reduces the external vulnerabil-
ity of Bolivia and Ecuador, but not that of the three
biggest members.
Thus, in spite of its modest resources, FLAR is al-
ready playing an important role in the international fi-
nances of the Andean Community members. If FLAR or
a successor with expanded capacity is to become an
institution capable of providing the finance needed by
its member countries, however, it will need consider-
ably larger resources. Various ways of securing these
are put forward in section VI below.
2. The ALADI Mutual Payments and Credits
Agreement (CPCR)
CPCR began to operate in 1969, its aim being to minimize
the use of the ALADI member countries’ international
reserves in the settlement of external trade transactions
among them. The system has two components: a
clearing house, with the Central Reserve Bank of Peru
acting as banking agent, and mutual lines of credit with
terms of four months. The banking agent carries out
settlements between creditors and debtors every four
months. The central banks have given each other
bilateral lines of credit in dollars which must likewise
be settled every four months. The system has been a
success, because a high and growing percentage of
intra-regional trade has been covered by its operations
(ECLAC, 1990). In 1990, the coverage of operations
handled by the Agreement compared with the total value
of intra-regional trade was almost 100%. At the same
time, the foreign exchange transferred by the banking
agent amounted to less than 20% of the total value of
the transactions. The existence of the CPCR has thus
meant a substantial saving of foreign exchange by the
central banks of the ALADI member countries.
The system was put to the test during the 1980s
crisis. Because of that crisis, some central banks had
difficulty in covering their debit balances and had to
leave the system temporarily, negotiating bilateral terms
of payment with the creditor central banks. As the
financial crisis eased, however, the central banks
returned to the system, which had recovered all its mem-
bers by 1988.
The 1981 Santo Domingo Agreement established
arrangements for granting credit to central banks which
were unable to settle their debit balances within the
four-month term. These arrangements provide credit
for an additional four months, renewable for up to one
year. The Agreement established a special credit
programme for countries with general balance of
payments deficits and those suffering from natural
disasters. In the first case, the term of the credit is for
two years, renewable for a further year, while in the
second case the term is for two years, renewable on a
TABLE 2
Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR):
Relative size of quotas at end of 1997
(Amounts in millions of dollars; ratios in percentages)
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
FLAR quotas 125 250 125 250 250
IMF quotas 170 757 296 628 2 633
International reserves 1 359 9 611 2 213 11 306 17 704
Short-term debt 374 5 759 2 069 6 832 4 395
Debt/reservesa 27.5 59.9 93.5 60.4 24.8
Debt/reserves as
augmented by FLARb 20.8 56.3 78.1 57.3 24.0
Source: IMF (1998); World Bank (1999); FLAR (1998).
a Ratio of short-term debt to reserves.
b Ratio of short-term debt to reserves as augmented by maximum indebtedness with FLAR.
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bilateral basis with the creditor central banks for five
years.
Unlike the FLAR, the CPCR does not have resources
of its own, but simply brings into effect the lines of
credit that the central banks agreed to previously. When
the crisis spread over the whole region, however, those
banks were not in a position to make the contributions
they had promised. This is why it is essential that such
a system of payments should operate in conjunction
with a larger regional institution with greater resources.
VI
Options for strengthening the
regional payments bodies
FLAR is undoubtedly an excellent starting point for mea-
sures to strengthen the regional financial institutions:
it already operates on a significant scale, and the func-
tions its member countries have assigned it are exactly
those that a regional financial mechanism should have.
In this section we will deal with various aspects that
must be taken into account in considering a possible
agreement by the countries of the region to set up a
Latin American financial institution.6
1. Membership
The regional fund would be open to all the countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean. Participation in a
regional fund along the lines of FLAR could be an
attractive proposition. The reserves deposited in it are
multiplied at times of crisis, and moreover the fund
could gain access to resources not available to the
individual countries.
2. Resources
The resources available to a regional fund must be com-
mensurate with its responsibilities. There are various
options in this respect:
a) Increases in the paid-up capital of the fund
The fund’s resources would increase with the entry of
new members. Consideration could also be given to an
increase in the level of the quotas, which currently rep-
resent between 9% and 1.5% of the FLAR member coun-
tries’ reserves.
b) Contingency credit commitments
The central banks of the member countries could
provide the fund with lines of credit that would only be
activated in the event of financial emergencies of a
predetermined nature. This solution would be similar
to the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and New
Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) between the
International Monetary Fund and the central banks of
the Group of Ten and Switzerland. The IMF also has a
parallel agreement with Saudi Arabia. Under the GAB,
11 industrialized countries or their central banks have
agreed to lend the Fund certain volumes of resources
at market interest rates in situations of financial crisis
which cannot be tackled with the IMF’s regular
resources. The NAB, which were approved in November
1994 as a result of the Mexican crisis, are similar to the
GAB, except that they involve 25 countries. The
resources available to the IMF under both arrangements
can be loaned to both participating and non-
participating countries. A mechanism of this type would
provide the Latin American fund with resources that
are much greater than its capital, for coping with
financial emergencies in its member countries.
c) Indebtedness on international capital markets
The IMF is not authorized to assume indebtedness in
order to finance its rescue operations for countries suf-
fering from financial crises. There is no impediment to
a Latin American institution doing this, however. A
Latin American fund could imitate the World Bank and
have two classes of capital: one would consist of the
quotas of the central banks, while the other would serve
6
 We are not necessarily suggesting that FLAR should become the
strengthened regional monetary body referred to in this article. The
exact way in which the region should progress from the present
institutions to one with greater resources and capacity for action is
a political question which goes beyond the scope of this article.
The aim of this section is simply to outline the features that a fu-
ture continental-scale financial body should have.
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as a guarantee for the fund to take out debt directly on
the market. This option would still be conservative, as
even under this system the gearing ratio of the fund
would still be less than 1.
Would the international financial markets be
willing to accept long-term bonds from a Latin
American fund, and would the spread for the fund’s
securities be less than for those of its member countries?
The answer to both questions is probably affirmative:
the joint guarantee of all the fund members would
necessarily be better than in the case of each of them
individually, since the financial capacity of a group of
countries acting together is greater than that of the
countries individually.7
By increasing the availability of financial
resources, this option would endow the fund with great
capacity to help member countries with financial
problems.
d) Contingency credits with the private banking
system
The fund could negotiate lines of credit with the
international private banking system, to be activated in
the event of financial crises threatening member
countries. The central banks of Argentina and Mexico
have already done this on an individual basis. The
intervention of a regional body could undoubtedly help
to obtain larger amounts of resources on better terms,
however, as it would be backed up by all the central
banks or governments of its member countries. This
option, together with that discussed in the previous sub-
section, could make the fund attractive even for big
countries needing finance at times of crisis on a scale
that could exceed the fund’s capacity.
e) Creation of “Latin American Special Drawing
Rights”
FLAR already has an instrument of this nature: the
“Andean Peso”, but a Latin American peso that could
be used in payments among the central banks of the
region would undoubtedly have more uses. A unit of
account of this nature could strengthen the CPCR and
help to minimize the use of international reserves.
As in the IMF, the member countries of the fund
and the CPCR would receive allocations of Latin
American pesos, which could be used in payments
among central banks to settle their debts in the CPCR.
Countries which registered a net absorption of Latin
American pesos would undertake to pay off their net
debit balances when their balance of payments situation
improved or within maximum terms to be determined
by the Board of Directors of FLAR. This option would
obviously call for close relations between CPCR and the
fund. CPCR could even become a direct dependency of
the fund.
f) Access to IMF resources
If the regional institutions were strengthened within the
context of a reform of the international financial archi-
tecture providing for the establishment of a network of
regional funds to complement the IMF in the event of a
crisis affecting a number of countries of the region, the
Latin American fund, like other funds, could serve as
an intermediary for the availability of resources between
the IMF and the countries in question (Ocampo, 1999,
p. 70). Likewise, the Latin American fund could be
designated as a recipient of special drawing rights
(SDRs), to which it could resort at times of crisis.8
3. Possible facilities of the fund and their
conditions
It would be necessary to lay down quite clearly the
occasions on which a country with balance of payments
problems could seek assistance from the fund. Thus,
four types of balance of payments problems should be
distinguished: (a) temporary shortage of international
liquidity; b) balance of payments crises due to
fundamental imbalances in the member country’s
economic policy; c) balance of payments crises by
contagion, and d) balance of payments problems due
to a transitory deterioration in the terms of trade.
a) Liquidity credits facility
FLAR already has a facility for tackling transitory
liquidity problems, under which countries can make
use of a certain proportion of their quotas (75% in the
7
 It could be argued that the spread payable by the fund would be a
weighted average of the spreads for the sovereign debt of its
members. We are assuming that the fund would enjoy substantial
synergies because it is an institution with the simultaneous guaran-
tees of a group of countries. In this sense, the existence of the fund
could be seen as the solution to a problem of collective action.
8
 In another study (Agosin, 1999) the present author argued that in
order to tackle acute crises in the international financial system
the IMF could resort to extraordinary issues of SDRs, which would
be annulled when the system returned to normal. The mere exist-
ence of such a possibility would make systemic crises less likely.
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case of the two less developed member countries and
50% in the case of the other three) for a period of up to
one year. A Latin American monetary institution could
incorporate this facility without much alteration.
b) Balance of payments support facility
This facility would be available to countries suffering
from balance of payments problems due to fundamen-
tal imbalances in their exchange, monetary or fiscal
policies. Such credits should be granted subject to strict
conditions, along the lines of the IMF. The regional fund
could even conceivably act in a concerted manner with
the IMF in these cases.
c) Contingency credit facility
This facility would have two objectives: to discourage
potential speculators and to persuade member
countries to coordinate their economic policies more
effectively.
If well designed, this facility would be used only
infrequently. It would be activated when a country
suffered from a balance of payments crisis associated
with capital flight that had nothing to do with
fundamental macroeconomic imbalances. FLAR already
has a contingency credit facility, approved quite
recently. However, the term it allows for repaying the
loans (six months) is too short, and the resources it has
available for this purpose are too scanty.
In order to avoid moral hazard problems, member
countries would have to satisfy some minimum prior
requirements in order to have access to this facility.
These could include progress in bank regulation,
especially with regard to potential currency mismatches
between assets and liabilities; financial fragility
indicators (ratios between short-term debt and reserves
and between reserves and M2), and current account
deficit targets.
It is important not to add too many dimensions to
these prior requisites. The mere fact of a country losing
access to the facility could set off capital flight.
Therefore, although it is impossible to do without some
degree of prior conditionality, the fund should be free
to manage this flexibly and constructively.
In order for the facility to be of use in halting herd
effects on international markets, its disbursements
should be quick and timely. If the interest rates charged
were higher than for other operations of the fund, this
would encourage user countries to repay the resources
loaned as quickly as possible.
d) Compensatory financing facility
This facility would be activated when a country was
facing balance of payments problems due to a transitory
and reversible deterioration in its terms of trade.
Consequently, as soon as those terms improved,
countries would be under the obligation to repay the
balance owed and/or loan resources to the fund, which
could maintain a special account for this purpose.
Debtor countries would pay interest, while creditors
would receive it. A further option would be to include
in this facility, as in the case of the IMF, the possibility
of granting credits to cover needs connected with
international interest rate rises.
As almost all Latin American countries suffer
pronounced fluctuations in their terms of trade, either
because the prices of their exports are volatile or
because this is true of the prices of some specific imports
(especially oil and grains). Terms-of-trade cycles are
not synchronized between countries. Indeed, the
movements of some key prices (such as those of oil,
for example) simultaneously improve the terms of trade
of some countries but depress those of others.9
It is therefore both possible and desirable that there
should be a regional fund to help countries to cope with
balance of payments problems due to this structural
condition of their economies. As there is a trade-off
between the countries whose terms of trade deteriorate
and those whose terms improve, a regional fund could
make much better use of foreign exchange than the
stabilization funds that some countries maintain for this
purpose. Countries which already have such funds
could contribute part of the resources deposited in them
to the regional fund. As already mentioned, these
contributions would be suitably remunerated.
There is generally no correlation between
movements in the terms of trade of the countries of the
region, so that it would be financially viable for a
regional body to operate a scheme like that suggested
here. For the period from 1981 to 1999, 55 coefficients
of correlation between the annual variations in the terms
of trade of the pairs of countries were studied, but of
9
 This is not only because some countries are exporters of oil while
others are net importers. There is also an indirect effect on the
prices of other industrial inputs. When oil prices rise, exports of
other commodities such as copper, iron ore or wood may go down
if the oil price rises generate expectations that the economic activity
of the industrialized countries will be adversely affected.
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these only 18 were significantly different from zero.10
Four of the 18 coefficients were negative; all of them
involved a gas or oil exporting and an importing country
(Bolivia-Brazil, Brazil-Ecuador, Brazil-Venezuela and
Costa Rica-Venezuela). Three of the coefficients of
correlation which were positive and significantly
different from zero were between gas or oil exporters
(Bolivia-Venezuela, Ecuador-Venezuela and Bolivia-
Ecuador), and one of them was between copper
exporters (Chile-Peru). The results are shown in table
3, with the coefficients which are significantly different
from zero in bold type.
A regional compensatory financing facility could
coordinate its activities with the corresponding facility
of the IMF. If this were possible, the regional fund could
mobilize more resources and help the countries of the
region to make more use of the IMF facility.
4. Coordination of economic policy and bank
supervision
A regional monetary institution could become a suitable
and probably very effective forum for coordination of
the economic policies of the countries of the region in
order to encourage member countries to maintain the
fundamental macroeconomic balances and thus
minimize the possibility of financial crises.
Coordination of policies, including those on capital
flows, is easier and more acceptable among peers than
when it is imposed by a far-off institution which may
be seen as hostile. A strengthened Latin American
financial system would therefore strengthen the
macroeconomic balances of its members and hence
make them less vulnerable to contagion.
Greater convergence of economic policies, together
with the existence of a regional financial fund with access
to substantial resources, would favour regional exchange
stability and make it possible to advance towards greater
integration of the Latin American economies.
The weakness of domestic banking supervision has
been one of the causes (although certainly not the only
one) of national financial crises. Among other
shortcomings, regulatory bodies have omitted –or been
unable– to prevent local banks from taking out
excessive debts in foreign currency and then lending
those resources to bodies which do not have foreign
currency incomes. A regional financial body could help
to substantially raise the standards of prudential
supervision of its members. As already noted, having
suitable standards (and ensuring that they are respected)
10
 At 10% significance. The stadigraph z =  , which has a
distribution t with n–2 degrees of freedom, was used. ρ is the esti-
mated value of the coefficient of correlation.
ρ√n – 2
√ 1 – ρ 2
TABLE 3
Latin America (10 countries): Coefficients of correlation
between variations in terms of trade, 1981-1999a
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia
Bolivia 0.62
Brazil –0.14 –0.55
Chile 0.01 –0.21 0.46
Colombia 0.44 0.40 0.05 –0.01
Costa Rica –0.22 –0.39 0.51 0.17 0.46
Ecuador 0.70 0.89 –0.67 –0.21 0.31
Paraguay 0.22 0.05 0.72 0.26 0.17
Peru 0.15 –0.22 0.47 0.82 –0.21
Uruguay 0.10 –0.10 0.16 0.70 –0.25
Venezuela 0.61 0.84 –0.60 –0.10 0.08
Costa Rica Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay
Ecuador –0.44
Paraguay 0.10 –0.28
Peru –0.02 –0.15 0.25
Uruguay –0.13 0.17 0.16 0.53
Venezuela –0.67 0.91 –0.20 0.02 0.04
Source:  ECLAC, 1999.
a Coefficients significantly different from zero are shown in bold type.
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could be made one of the prior conditions for having
access to the contingency credit facility. The regional
body could also institute periodic appraisals of national
banking supervision and establish standards that could
be adopted by all its members.
The existence of a regional fund would also make
possible a fluid exchange of information about the
various countries’ experience regarding policies for the
prudential regulation of capital movements. This would
facilitate progress towards regionally concerted
policies on this important and delicate subject, which
would help to ease the financial crises which, as already
noted, tend to result from excessive inflows of foreign
capital.
VII
The feasibility and size of an
expanded regional fund
Is it feasible to expand regional financial cooperation
in the way we have been suggesting in this study?
Whether this is so or not will depend on the magnitude
of national crises and the degree of co-variance between
them. If all the countries of the region suffer balance of
payments crises simultaneously through financial
contagion (or through deterioration of the terms of
trade), a regional fund could be non-viable from the
financial point of view.
In order to answer the queries about the co-variance
of national crises, an analysis was made, for pairs of
countries, of the correlation between changes in capital
flows (less foreign direct investment and official flows) in
the period from 1978 to 1998 (table 4). The period was
divided into two sub-periods, 1978-1987 and 1988-1998,
in order to see how far co-variance has increased between
capital flows to different countries. In table 4, the bilateral
correlation coefficients which are significantly different
from zero at 10% significance are shown in bold type.
This analysis showed that there is indeed
considerable co-variance between capital flows to
different Latin American countries, but this is not large
enough to make a regional fund financially inviable. In
1988-1998, only 22 out of 55 coefficients of correlation
were positive and significantly different from zero.
Another conclusion which could back up the need for
a regional fund is the increase over time in the number
of high bilateral correlations: thus, positive correlations
significantly different from zero increased from 11 to
22 between 1978-1987 and 1988-1998, whereas the
number of negative and significant correlations
remained unchanged at two.
In order to determine how big a regional fund
should be, an analysis was also made of the annual
changes in private capital flows (excluding foreign
direct investment) to the six largest countries of the
region, except Mexico, over the period from 1991 to
1998. If there are annual outflows from all the countries
simultaneously, it is unlikely that a regional fund would
be able to cope with them. Table 5 shows that there is a
tendency for both increases and decreases in foreign
private capital to be correlated among the countries,
but there is sufficient divergence among the individual
situations to make a regional fund viable. Thus, for
example, whereas in 1994 Argentina had a great need
of finance due to the “tequila crisis”, Brazil registered
heavy inflows of capital. Exactly the opposite occurred
in 1997-1998. The maximum amount of resources
needed may be estimated as the sum of the negative
figures in table 5. In those crisis years, that amount
was between US$ 25 and 30 billion, which a regional
fund could certainly handle.
It is important to bear in mind that the existence of
a regional fund with the capacity to deal with crises
could result in a change of climate: stopping a crisis in
one country could considerably reduce the probability
that it would spread to other countries. In other words,
the existence of the fund would reduce the co-variance
of capital flows to the countries of the region.
If it is true that crises are sequential and that the
existence of a big enough fund would reduce the
probability of contagion for other countries of the
region, then the fund should have sufficient resources
to ensure that a vulnerable member country capable of
giving rise to contagion should be able to cope with
the non-renewal of its short-term debt. A fund that had,
say, 15% of the reserves of the 11 countries shown in
table 6 (some US$ 20 billion in 1997, which was the
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TABLE 4
Latin America (10 countries): Coefficients of
correlation between net inflows of capital, 1978-1998ab
1978-1998
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia
Bolivia 0.02
Brazil 0.30 –0.20
Chile 0.22 –0.49 0.41
Colombia 0.50 –0.07 0.61 0.29
Costa Rica 0.54 –0.07 0.38 0.17 0.13
Ecuador 0.27 –0.19 0.66 0.38 0.09
Paraguay 0.58 –0.01 0.51 0.34 0.37
Peru 0.58 –0.43 0.62 0.61 0.40
Uruguay 0.29 0.05 0.26 0.45 0.03
Venezuela 0.04 0.13 –0.09 0.16 –0.39
Costa Rica Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay
Ecuador 0.66
Paraguay 0.47 0.45
Peru 0.52 0.42 0.76
Uruguay 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.30
Venezuela 0.15 0.37 0.25 0.00 0.08
1978-1987
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia
Bolivia –0.20
Brazil 0.27 –0.23
Chile 0.41 –0.57 0.39
Colombia –0.19 –0.29 0.42 0.46
Costa Rica 0.67 0.26 0.42 0.11 –0.11
Ecuador 0.65 –0.05 0.75 0.35 0.07
Paraguay 0.36 0.00 0.42 0.58 0.19
Peru 0.32 –0.76 0.55 0.75 0.43
Uruguay 0.38 0.06 0.11 0.45 –0.37
Venezuela 0.71 0.29 0.13 0.17 –0.38
Costa Rica Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay
Ecuador 0.83
Paraguay 0.30 0.44
Peru 0.05 0.33 0.56
Uruguay 0.13 0.30 0.36 0.04
Venezuela 0.88 0.62 0.22 –0.08 0.43
1988-1998
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia
Bolivia 0.51
Brazil 0.36 0.33
Chile 0.33 0.47 0.44
Colombia 0.60 0.18 0.88 0.33
Costa Rica 0.65 0.06 0.13 –0.01 0.33
Ecuador 0.36 0.07 0.33 0.27 0.39
Paraguay 0.62 0.82 0.57 0.15 0.51
Peru 0.71 0.80 0.63 0.52 0.52
Uruguay 0.60 0.55 0.73 0.33 0.60
Venezuela –0.10 0.38 –0.43 0.14 –0.41
Costa Rica Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay
Ecuador –0.24
Paraguay 0.13 0.30
Peru 0.51 0.12 0.76
Uruguay 0.57 0.17 0.67 0.92
Venezuela –0.56 –0.06 0.10 –0.22 –0.56
Source: IMF, 1999.
a
 Excluding flows of foreign direct investment and official flows.
b
 Bilateral coefficients of correlation significantly different from zero at 10% are shown in bold type.
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last “normal” year for the region as a whole) could
comfortably cover capital flight equal to the entire short-
term debt of each country in the group in question except
Brazil. In order to cover the possibility of simultaneous
capital flight from more than one country, contingency
credit lines like those suggested earlier in this article
would give the fund even greater financial capacity.
The first line of defence against capital flight is a
country’s own reserves. As may be seen from table 6,
the Latin American countries are quite prudent in this
respect, since in all of them the 1997 reserves more
than covered their total short-term debt, which was not
the case in the Asian countries in the last crisis. It must
be borne in mind, however, that in a crisis capital flight
includes other components, such as the liquidation of
foreign portfolio investments and the replacement, by
domestic investors, of their local-currency assets with
others in foreign currency.
In crisis situations, the maximum dimension of
pressures on the balance of payments is determined by
the amount of money. If the agents lose all confidence
in an economy, they will try to convert a large proportion
of their liquid assets into foreign exchange. Those liquid
assets are determined by the stocks of local currency,
which could be measured for this purpose as M1
(currency in circulation plus demand deposits) or M2
(M1 plus term deposits and savings accounts). The
corresponding figures are shown in table 6, which
TABLE 6
Latin America (11 countries): International reserves,
short-term debt and money supply, 1997
(Billions of dollars)
International reserves Short-term debt Money supply (M1) Money supply (M2)
Argentina 22.8 18.0 21.5 77.6
Bolivia 1.2 0.4 0.7 3.8
Brazil 52.0 36.2 47.3 236.5
Chile 17.7 9.9 7.7 33.6
Colombia 9.7 5.7 10.3 24.9
Costa Rica 1.3 0.5 1.5 4.0
Ecuador 2.2 2.1 1.7 6.7
Paraguay 0.7 0.5 0.9 2.9
Peru 11.3 6.8 5.7 16.8
Uruguay 1.7 1.9 1.1 8.6
Venezuela 15.2 4.4 11.4 19.0
Total 135.8 86.3
Source:  World Bank (1999) and IMF (1999).
TABLE 5
Latin America: Changes in private capital flowsa
to six countries of the region, 1991-1998
(Billions of dollars)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Peru Venezuela Totalb
1991 5.6 0.7 –2.3 –0.6 –0.2 –12.8 –15.8
1992 3.9 9.0 1.6 0.6 1.1 1.4 0.0
1993 26.2 2.7 0.2 2.9 –0.5 –0.9 –1.4
1994 –21.6 31.5 0.1 0.2 0.5 –5.3 –26.9
1995 –11.6 –15.3 –1.6 1.1 0.1 1.3 –28.5
1996 8.7 1.7 1.2 0.0 –0.5 0.4 –0.5
1997 1.4 –18.4 –1.0 –3.2 2.3 –1.0 –23.6
1998 4.0 –20.9 –4.6 0.6 –2.7 0.8 28.2
Source: IMF, 1999.
a Excluding foreign direct investment.
b Total reduction in private finance.
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indicates that 15% of the reserves of the 11 countries
in question would come to US$ 20.4 billion. This means
that all those countries, except Brazil and Argentina,
could cope with capital flight equal to the whole of
their M2 by using their own reserves (85% of the figures
shown in table 6 under “international reserves” plus
those of a fund set up with 15% of the reserves of the
countries as a whole. Argentina, for its part, could
finance capital outflows equal to the whole of its M1
or over half of its M2. In other words, a fund with 15%
of the reserves represents an important potential for
discouraging speculative attacks against the currencies
of the region. If, in addition, it could have other sources
of finance like those suggested earlier, the proposed
fund could play an important role in promoting the
stability of the Latin American economies.
VIII
Conclusions
This article has argued in favour of the establishment
of a regional fund which would help to fill a gap in the
international financial architecture. Such a fund would
be extremely useful for the countries of the region as
an additional line of defense against international
financial crises, which have become increasingly
exogenous to national policies and will probably
continue to affect the region even though its countries
continue to improve the quality of their macroeconomic
policies.
A regional fund is no substitute for macroeconomic
prudence, of course. Its existence would rather be a
means of helping the countries of the region to continue
improving the quality of their macroeconomic policies.
A fund with substantial resources for lending to
countries that apply good policies would be a powerful
incentive in that direction.
A regional fund could be conceived either as part
of a thorough-going reform of the present financial
structure or as a body that would fit into a system that
would not undergo fundamental changes. Although the
first scenario is the most favourable from the point of
view of the new body’s efficiency in protecting the
countries of the region from the adverse effects of
international financial disturbances, such a fund would
in fact be even more necessary in the second scenario.
In any case, as we have argued in the preceding section,
a regional fund of the type described is not outside the
financial capabilities of the Latin American countries
in the present circumstances.
A regional fund like that proposed would have the
additional mission -of great importance for the future
development of the region- of helping to integrate the
regional economy through the promotion of exchange
stability and the coordination of macroeconomic
policies. In their policies to promote regional
integration, so far the countries have given priority to
progress in the harmonization of trade policies. The
trade barriers between them have tended to go down
significantly in the last decade, and the setbacks
observed have almost always been related with financial
disturbances. In some cases, governments have had to
resort to trade protection in order to defend themselves
from the effects of capital inflows which cause
exchange rate appreciation and threaten internationally
tradeable domestic activities. In others, capital flight
has caused balance of payments crises which leave no
alternative but to restrict trade flows. The biggest
menace to the progress of regional integration is
undoubtedly international financial instability, which
has significantly increased exchange rate volatility and
domestic instability in the countries of the region.
The institutional mechanism proposed here could
soften the adverse effects of international financial
instability on the national economies and also help the
countries to progress towards economic integration.
With each financial crisis that periodically hits the
countries of the region, the advances in integration
which have been obtained with so much effort are
usually succeeded by partial setbacks. Greater stability
of exchange rates and of the domestic economies would
allow the Latin American countries to converge towards
the long-desired trade integration: a dream that began
four decades ago but has still not been realized.
(Original: Spanish)
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